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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to develop an integrated analytical framework for revolution, reform, and involution 
under dictatorship based on China’s history. In order to grasp the essence of political and economic 
interactions in historic China, this paper gets some abstract variables from China’s history, on the basis 
of which a political economy model is built. The autocrat plays an important role in determining 
authority form and development pattern, which endogenously brings about different outcomes of 
revolution, reform, and involution. When the economic system is closed, path-dependence plays an 
important role, however, when the system is open, we should not attach much importance to 
path-dependence. 
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Many economists and social scientists believe that special-interest groups usually play a 
negative role in economic development. As most of us know, collective actions are often 
accompanied by the free-rider problem, which determines that small or strong special-interest 
groups are more powerful than large or weak ones, as the former can overcome this difficulty 
more effectively than the latter. Just as Olson says [1]: “Indeed unless the number of 
individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device 
to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not 
act to achieve their common or group interests.” 
If the small or strong special-interest group represents the autocrat and his ruling class, then 
what can we infer from this special-interest-group perspective? When will the autocrat 
choose efficient institutions on behalf of his interest-group? And when will not? As 
Acemoglu argues [2, pp. 620-623]: “These inefficient institutions and policies are chosen 
because they serve the interests of politicians and social groups that hold political power at 
the expense of the rest … The theoretical case depends on commitment problem inherent in 
politics. First, those in power cannot commit to not using their power, as long as they don’t 
relinquish it, in ways that benefit them in the future. Second, if the rulers relinquish their 
power, the citizens cannot commit to making side payments to them in the future because the 
former rulers no longer possess the political power to enforce such promises.” So there is no 
political Coasian theorem which ensures that political power can match with economic 
development by voluntary political exchange. However, based on China’s history I argue that 
there is a political economy theory about revolution, reform, and involution under 
dictatorship, and that there lies an implicit mechanism that can ensure the acceptable 
efficiency of the political process. As such, this implicit mechanism can give rise to different 
outcomes of revolution, reform, and involution. 
This paper tries to integrate historic China’s revolution, reform and involution into a unified 
analytical framework, under which all of these phenomena are endogenously engendered by 
autocrat’s choice. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic 
model. Section 3 extends the basic model. Section 4 makes some concluding remarks. 
BASIC MODEL 
In order to convey my idea, I assume that there are only three classes, the upper class 
representing the autocrat’s interests, the middle class representing the commercial and 
industrial interests, and the lower class representing the agricultural interests1. During 
different development periods, there are different institutions that are determined by the 
autocrat, which bring about different outcomes. The so-called political Coasian theorem 
works to some degree through the interactions between revolution, reform and involution. 
In the model,  (0 <  < 1) and u are the proportion and unit interest of the upper class, 
respectively. Similarly,  (0 <  < 1) and m are, respectively, the proportion and unit interest 
of the middle class. Finaly, 1 –  –  (0 < 1 –  –  < 1) and l are the proportion and unit 
interest of the lower class, respectively. The so-called unit interest stands for each actor’s 
economic gains which are normalized according to the total population. As for the upper 
class which is represented by the autocrat, the unit interest denotes each actor’s normalized 
incumbent gains during the course of providing public goods and services (such as 
bureaucratic governance). As for the middle and lower classes, the unit interest denotes each 
actor’s normalized economic gains which are related to his average productivity during the 
course of production and transactions. It is taken that2 m > l.
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Inspired by the spirit of Aghion and Tirole [3], I assume that the tax rate of the middle class is 
 (0    1), and that the tax rate of the lower class is3  (0    1). However, taxation 
should not be seen as a straight division of the pie because the autocrat provides some kind of 
protection and other public goods and services for the lower and middle classes. 
As for the autocrat, the lower class is easier to be controlled than the middle class, because 
the former is more immobile and honest than the latter. In order to control the middle class 
effectively and make the lower class have no incentive to become the middle class, the autocrat 
has to take the taxation as a tool, which means  > . So the autocrat faces a tradeoff between 
controllability and profitability. As most of us know, controllability is mainly a political 
problem, while profitability is mainly an economic problem. However, the autocrat is not 
only an economic person, but also a political person. Moreover, the autocrat’s idea about 
controllability and profitability maybe changes according to the dominant thinking of that time. 
As I have stressed in the introduction (Section 1), the autocrat represents the ruling class. The 
autocrat’s utility derives from three terms. The first term is the autocrat’s gains from 
providing public goods and services (such as bureaucratic governance). The second term is 
the autocrat’s gains from the middle class’ taxes. The third term is the autocrat’s gains from 
the lower class’ taxes. In fact, the autocrat’s utility can be seen as a proxy for the economic 
performance. In order to defend this point, I will give two channels through which the 
autocrat can improve the economic performance. The first channel is to promote the 
bureaucratic governance, and the second channel is to expand the middle class. 
The autocrat’s utility function, S, is4: 
 S = u + m + (1 –  – )l. (1) 
The autocrat himself has certain beliefs which determine the authority form and development 
pattern. If he appreciates social stability or he faces no external pressure, he may suppress the 
middle class and support the lower class, as the agricultural economy is easier to be 
controlled. If he appreciates economic prosperity or he faces great external pressure, he may 
support the middle class, as the commercial and industrial economy is pregnant with wealth. 
When the economy is closed and the information is impacted, there is no or little knowledge-
based exchange with the outside world, so competitive pressure is very small and the autocrat 
has no idea of imitation. However, when exchange cost between nations becomes less and 
less, the competitive pressure plays a more and more important role in motivating laggards to 
catch-up. In order to reflect the importance of the degree of openness, I introduce the concept 
of survival gains in the extension of the basic model (Section 3). 
In most cases  is a constant parameter, but when there are wars or irrigation works, the 
autocrat has to raise his taxes on the lower class, which will increase  to some degree. That 
is to say,  is a variable which can be controlled by the autocrat. Thus, if  is too big (e.g., 
   ) to sustain the lower class’ living, a rebellious revolution will be incurred. So there is a 
rebellious revolution constraint: 
    . (2) 
Variable  can also be controlled by the autocrat. If it is too big to keep the middle class exist 
(e.g.,    ), economic development will be trapped in a low-level equilibrium which is 
called an involution5. In fact, in most times in China’s history, the autocrat keeps the middle 
class as small as possible through the taxation tool. The middle class can not start a rebellious 
revolution, because its quantity is too small to form a valid threat. So there is an involution 
constraint6: 
    . (3) 
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When the economic system meets the revolution and involution constraints, but the autocrat 
is not satisfied with the economic performance (e.g., S  S ), there will be a reform constraint: 
 S  S . (4) 
The autocrat plays an important role in increasing or decreasing economic performance, as S  is 
a subjective value which is determined by the autocrat’s judgment. If the autocrat is ambitious 
or able, he may set S  at a big value. However, if he is fatuous or incapable, he may set S  at 
a small value. Certainly, external factors may influence the autocrat’s judgment. For example, 
if there is a tax income boom, the autocrat may suffer from some kind of “resource curse.” 
To summarize, we have the following result: 
Result 1: If an economic system under dictatorship doesn’t meet the rebellious revolution 
constraint, then a rebellious revolution will be incurred. If this system meets the rebellious 
revolution constraint but doesn’t meet the involution constraint, then an involution will be 
incurred. If this system meets the rebellious revolution and involution constraint but doesn’t 
meet the reform constraint, then a reform will be needed. 
If the economic system under dictatorship takes market-supporting or market-augmenting 
measures to promote its economic development, then the middle class will swell in quantity. 
When  is less than a critical vale (e.g.,    ), the middle class will be so powerful as to start a 
constitutional revolution to overturn the autocrat. So there is a constitutional revolution constraint: 
    . (5) 
Thus we obtain the second result: 
Result 2: If an economic system under dictatorship is stable, then it must meet one of the 
following conditions: (i)     and    , or (ii)     and       . When condition (i) 
is met, the system is locked in an involution, which is called super-stability characterized 
with old dynastic China. When condition (ii) is met, the system is on the track of development, 
which is called dynamic-stability characterized with contemporary transitional China. 
The basic model is obviously very descriptive, as it is based on China’s complex history and 
tries to get the abstract variables from the whole development process. A richer economic 
environment can be added in order to analyze the autocrat’s different choices under different 
conditions. 
EXTENSION OF THE BASIC MODEL 
In order to grasp the essence of the institutional change, especially the political change, I 
extend my basic model in a two-dimensional way. The extensions correspond to China’s 
history, too. In fact, we will find that there does exist an implicit mechanism that can ensure 
the acceptable efficiency of the political process. 
When the economic system is closed, it can learn little from the outside world, and at the 
same time this exerts no competitive pressure on the autocrat. During the course of the 
evolution of the system, path dependence will play an important role. In order to control the 
system at a low cost, the autocrat will make a tradeoff between controllability and 
profitability. In fact, the autocrat may smother up the knotty problem of profitability in the 
absence of competitive pressure. 
As I have assumed, the instability mainly comes from the middle class’ mobility and 
speculation. For simplicity, I assume that the autocrat’s political gain, R, is ’s function, 
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which is strictly decreasing and concave (R' < 0, R'' < 0). So the autocrat’s rational choice is 
to increase  to  , and at the same time  will drop to  . 
Economic losses, EL, will be7: 
 EL = ( –  )[(  – )m – ρl]. (6) 
Political gains, PG, will be 
 PG = R(  ) – R(). (7) 
The rational autocrat will let economic losses be equal to political gains at the margin, which 
yields the following equation: 
 R'(  ) = ρl – (  – )m. (8) 
The condition m > l can ensure R'(  ) < 0, which is compatible with the previous assumption. 
Through the comparative static analysis, we obtain the third result. 
Result 3: In a closed system under dictatorship: 
  /ρ < 0,   /l < 0,   / > 0 and   /m > 0. 
Proof: From equation (8), we get 
  /ρ = 1/R''(  ) < 0,   /l = ρ/R''(  ) < 0, 
  / = -m/R''(  ) > 0 and   /m = –( –  )/R''(  ) > 0. 
Result 3 implies that   is decreasing in ρ and l, respectively, while increasing in m and , 
respectively. The more ρ and l, the less  , which is characteristic of the old dynastic China 
who was previously trapped in an involution. We can conclude that the more closed the 
system, the more possible it is locked in an involution. In fact, it shows that there are great 
path-dependence effects when the system is closed. 
When the economic system is open, it can learn much from the outer world, and at the same 
time this exerts great competitive pressure on the autocrat. During the course of the evolution 
of the system, path dependence will play an insignificant role. In order to cope with 
challenges at a low cost, the autocrat has to trade off between profitability and controllability, 
which means that he must undertake a reform. 
Competitive pressure is more important than path dependence, because the autocrat will 
adopt adaptive behavior according to his sufferings. In order to survive, the autocrat has to 
increase  to   at the cost of domestic instability. I suppose that survival gains, P, are the 
function of economic gains, EG, which are strictly increasing and concave (P' > 0, P'' < 0). 
Economic gains will be: 
 EG = (   – )[(  – )M – ρL]. (9) 
Survival gains, SG, will be8: 
 SG = P(EG). (10) 
Political losses, PL, will be: 
 PL = R() – R(  ). (11) 
The rational autocrat will make economic gains plus survival gains equal to political losses at 
the margin, which produces the following equation 
 R'(  ) = [1 + P'(EG)][ρL – (  – )M]. (12) 
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Through the comparative static analysis, we have the fourth result: 
Result 4: In an open system under dictatorship, the impacts of , L,  and M on   are all ambiguous. 
Proof: From equation (8), we can get the related partial derivatives, and it is easy to find that 
their signs are all ambiguous. 
Result 4 shows that path-dependence plays a trivial role when the system is open, just as we 
have anticipated. Great competitive pressure can easily break through path-dependence 
effects, as it produces additional benefits which are called survival gains. In order to increase 
S, the autocrat has to take effective measures to reform the economic system, such as raise  
to  . But when the autocrat chooses a market-supporting or market-augmenting development 
strategy under great competitive pressure, he will be overturned by a constitutional revolution 
when the middle class grows in strength to some critical degree. Dictatorship has a 
self-destruction mechanism in this sense, once it is on the track of market. This is the 
dictator’s fatalism. Shen points out that a good dictator encourages private investment and the 
cost of this encouragement is that the ensuing higher growth rate will induce earlier 
democratization [4]. Zak and Feng’s model also demonstrates that the economic position of 
the middle class determines the rate of transition from dictatorship to democracy [5]. Under 
this circumstance, accompanied by continuous high economic growth rate, China will have to 
undertake a series of political reforms which are oriented towards democratic process in order 
to reconcile the social and political conflicts. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I mainly discuss the conditions of revolution, reform, and involution under 
dictatorship based on China’s history. When the system is closed, path-dependence plays an 
important role, however, when the system is open, we should not attach much importance to 
path-dependence. 
Certainly, we should not neglect the intergenerational negative externality of dictatorship, 
which has an important effect on the autocrat’s choice and behavior. As Olson argues [6, p. 571]: 
“Many autocrats, at least at times, have had short time horizons: the examples of 
confiscations, repudiated loans, debased coinages, and inflated currencies perpetrated by 
monarchs and dictators over the course of history are almost beyond counting.” Once the 
autocrat’s predecessor has made wrong decisions, the successor has to bear their externalities. 
At the same time, the autocrat may form wrong expectations or make wrong judgment on ρ,  
and S. All of those will bring about different outcomes of revolution, reform, and involution. 
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REMARKS 
1This classification is obvious for developing economies, especially for China, but may be 
obscure for developed economies. 
2This implies that the middle class faces more repression from the autocrat than the lower 
class. However, its number of population is too small to initiate a rebellious revolution, so it 
has to stand this kind of repression. 
3The utility functions of the lower and the middle are L = (1 – ρ)(1 –  – )l and M = (1 – )m, 
respectively. 
4From this and note 3, we can obtain the social utility function S + M + L = u + m + (1 –  – )l. 
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6It is easy for us to get the relation between   and  , namely,    1 – (1 –  )l/m. 
5The so-called involution is a terminology which refers to being trapped in a stagnant state in 
which industrial revolution cannot come into being. This terminology is connected with the 
famous Needham puzzle (see [7, 8]), which is common sense for Chinese background 
scholars and coined as neijuan in Chinese language. Tullock’s work [9] is conducive to 
understanding the nondemocratic system of the old empire of China. 
7I assume that the middle class decreased will turn into the lower class, and that the middle 
class increased will be from the lower class. 
8Survival gains are derived from external competitive pressure, which reflect a nation’s 
quasi-natural selection process. So they are different from political gains. 
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POLITIČKO-EKONOMSKI OBRAZAC KINESKE POVIJESTI: 
O REVOLUCIJI, REFORMI I INVOLUCIJI POD DIKTATUROM 
J. Pi 
 Kineski centar za ekonomska istraživanja, Sveučilište u Pekingu, 
 Peking, Narodna Republika Kina 
SAŽETAK 
U ovom radu razvija se integrirani analitički okvir za revoluciju, reformu i involuciju u diktaturama, temeljen na 
povijesti Kine. Radi obuhvaćanja osnova političkih i ekonomskih međudjelovanja u kineskoj povijesti, u radu je 
izdvojeno nekoliko apstraktnih varijabli iz kineske povijesti. Na temelju njih je postavljen političko-ekonomski 
model. Autokrati su odigrali značajnu ulogu u određivanju oblika autoriteta i obrasca razvoja, što je kroz 
unutarnje procese dovodilo do revolucije, reforme i involucije. Kad je ekonomski sustav zatvoren, ovisnost o 
putu je značajna. Naprotiv, kad je sustav otvoren, ovisnosti o putu se ne smije dati veliko značenje. 
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